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Abstract
Security models for two-party authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols have developed over
time to capture the security of AKE protocols even when the adversary learns certain secret values.
Increased granularity of security can be modelled by considering partial leakage of secrets in the
manner of models for leakage-resilient cryptography, designed to capture side-channel attacks. In this
work, we use the strongest known partial-leakage-based security model for key exchange protocols,
namely continuous after-the-fact leakage eCK (CAFL-eCK) model. We resolve an open problem by
constructing the first concrete two-pass leakage-resilient key exchange protocol that is secure in the
CAFL-eCK model.
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1 Introduction
During the past two decades side-channel attacks have become a familiar method of attacking cryptographic
systems. Examples of information which may leak during executions of cryptographic systems, and so
allow side-channel attacks, include timing information [6, 8, 18], electromagnetic radiation [15], and
power consumption [21]. Leakage may reveal partial information about the secret parameters which
have been used for computations in cryptographic systems. In order to abstractly model leakage attacks,
cryptographers have proposed the notion of leakage-resilient cryptography [1, 4, 7, 13, 14, 17, 16, 20]. In
this notion the information that leaks is not fixed, but instead chosen adversarially, so as to model any
possible physical leakage function. A variety of different cryptographic primitives have been developed in
recent years. As one of the most widely used cryptographic primitives, it is important to analyze the
leakage resilience of key exchange protocols.
Earlier key exchange security models, such as the Bellare–Rogaway [5], Canetti–Krawczyk [9], and
extended Canetti–Krawczyk (eCK) [19] models, aim to capture security against an adversary who can fully
compromise some, but not all, secret values. This is not a very granular form of leakage, and thus is not
suitable for modelling side-channel attacks in key exchange protocols enabled by partial leakage of secret
keys. This motivates the development of leakage-resilient key exchange security models [4, 11, 22, 23, 2].
Among them the generic security model proposed by Alawatugoda et al. [2] in 2014 facilitates more
granular leakage.
Alawatugoda et al. [2] proposed a generic leakage-security model for key exchange protocols, which
can be instantiated as either a bounded leakage variant or as a continuous leakage variant. In the bounded
leakage variant, the total amount of leakage is bounded, whereas in the continuous leakage variant, each
protocol execution may reveal a fixed amount of leakage. Further, the adversary is allowed to obtain the
leakage even after the session key is established for the session under attack (after-the-fact leakage). In
Section 3 we review the continuous leakage instantiation of the security model proposed by Alawatugoda
et al.
Alawatugoda et al. [2] also provided a generic construction for a protocol which is proven secure in
their generic leakage-security model. However, when it comes to a concrete construction, the proposed
generic protocol can only be instantiated in a way that is secure in the bounded version of the security
model. Until now there are no suitable cryptographic primitives which can be used to instantiate the
generic protocol in the continuous leakage variant of the security model.
Our aim is to propose a concrete protocol construction which can be proven secure in the continuous
leakage instantiation of the security model of Alawatugoda et al. Thus, we introduce the first concrete
construction of continuous and after-the-fact leakage-resilient key exchange protocol.
Bounded Leakage and Continuous Leakage.
Generally, in models assuming bounded leakage there is an upper bound on the amount of leakage
information for the entire period of execution. The security guarantee only holds if the leakage amount is
below the prescribed bound. Differently, in models allowing continuous leakage the adversary is allowed
to obtain leakage over and over for a polynomial number of iterations during the period of execution.
Naturally, there is a bound on the amount of leakage that the adversary can obtain in each single iteration,
but the total amount of leakage that the adversary can obtain for the entire period of execution is
unbounded.
After-the-fact Leakage.
The concept of after-the-fact leakage has been applied previously to encryption primitives. Generally,
leakage which happens after the challenge is given to the adversary is considered as after-the-fact leakage.
In key exchange security models, the challenge to the adversary is to distinguish the session key of a
chosen session, usually called the test session, from a random session key [5, 9, 19], After-the-fact leakage
is the leakage which happens after the test session is established.
Our Contribution.
Alawatugoda et al. [2] left the construction of a continuous after-the-fact leakage-resilient eCK secure key
exchange protocol as an open problem. In this paper, we construct such a protocol (protocol P2) using
existing leakage-resilient cryptographic primitives. We use leakage-resilient storage schemes and their
refreshing protocols [12] for this construction.
3
Table 1 compares the proposed protocol P2, with the NAXOS protocol [19], the Moriyama-Okamoto
(MO) protocol [22] and the generic Alawatugoda et al. [2] protocol instantiation, by means of computation
cost, security model and the proof model.
Protocol Initiator cost Responder cost Leakage Feature After-the-fact Proof model
NAXOS [19] 4 Exp 4 Exp None None Random oracle
MO [22] 8 Exp 8 Exp Bounded No Standard
Alawatugoda et al. [2] 12 Exp 12 Exp Bounded Yes Standard
Protocol P2 (this paper) 6 Exp 6 Exp Continuous Yes Random oracle
Table 1: Security and efficiency comparison of leakage-resilient key exchange protocols
In protocol P2, the secret key is encoded into two equal-sized parts of some chosen size, and the
leakage bound from each of the two parts is 15% of the size of a part, per occurrence. Since this is a
continuous leakage model the total leakage amount is unbounded. More details of the leakage tolerance
of protocol P2 may be found in Section 5.3.
2 Preliminaries
We discuss the preliminaries which we use for the protocol constructions.
2.1 Diffie–Hellman Problems
Let G be a group generation algorithm and (G, q, g)← G(1k), where G is a cyclic group of prime order q
and g is an arbitrary generator.
Definition 2.1 (Computational Diffie–Hellman (CDH) Problem). Given an instance (g, ga, gb) for
a, b
$←− Zq, the CDH problem is to compute gab.
Definition 2.2 (Decision Diffie–Hellman (DDH) Problem). Given an instance (g, ga, gb, gc) for a, b
$←− Zq
and either c
$←− Zq or c = ab, the DDH problem is to distinguish whether c = ab or not.
Definition 2.3 (Gap Diffie–Hellman (GDH) Problem). Given an instance (g, ga, gb) for a, b
$←− Zq, the
GDH problem is to find gab given access to an oracle O that solves the DDH problem.
2.2 Leakage-Resilient Storage
We review the definitions of leakage-resilient storage according to Dziembowski et al. [12]. The idea
behind their construction is to split the storage of elements into two parts using a randomized encoding
function. As long as leakage is then limited from each of its two parts then no adversary can learn useful
information about an encoded element. The key observation of Dziembowski et al. is then to show how
such encodings can be refreshed in a leakage-resilient way so that the new parts can be re-used. To
construct a continuous leakage-resilient primitive the relevant secrets are split, used separately, and then
refreshed between any two usages.
Definition 2.4 (Dziembowski-Faust leakage-resilient storage scheme). For any m,n ∈ N, the storage
scheme Λn,mZ∗q = (Encode
n,m
Z∗q ,Decode
n,m
Z∗q ) efficiently stores elements s ∈ (Z∗q)m where:
• Encoden,mZ∗q (s) : sL
$←− (Z∗q)n\{(0n)}, then sR ← (Z∗q)n×m such that sL · sR = s and outputs (sL, sR).
• Decoden,mZ∗q (sL, sR) : outputs sL · sR.
In the model we expect an adversary to see the results of a leakage function applied to sL and sR. This
may happen each time computation occurs.
Definition 2.5 (λ-limited adversary). If the amount of leakage obtained by the adversary from each
of sL and sR is limited to λ = (λ1, λ2) bits in total respectively, the adversary is known as a λ-limited
adversary.
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Definition 2.6 ((λΛ, 1)-secure leakage-resilient storage scheme). We say Λ = (Encode,Decode) is
(λΛ, 1)-secure leakage-resilient, if for any s0, s1
$←− (Z∗q)m and any λΛ-limited adversary C, the leakage
from Encode(s0) = (s0L, s0R) and Encode(s1) = (s1L, s1R) are statistically 1-close. For an adversary-
chosen leakage function f = (f1, f2), and a secret s such that Encode(s) = (sL, sR), the leakage is denoted
as
(
f1(sL), f2(sR)
)
.
Lemma 2.1 ([12]). Suppose that m < n/20. Then Λn,mZ∗q = (Encode
n,m
Z∗q ,Decode
n,m
Z∗q ) is (λ, )-secure for
some  and λ = (0.3 · n log q, 0.3 · n log q).
The encoding function can be used to design different leakage resilient schemes with bounded leakage.
The next step is to define how to refresh the encoding so that a continuous leakage is also possible to
defend against.
Definition 2.7 (Refreshing of Leakage-Resilient Storage). Let (L′, R′)← Refreshn,mZ∗q (L,R) be a refreshing
protocol that works as follows:
• Input : (L,R) such that L ∈ (Z∗q)n and R ∈ (Z∗q)n×m.
• Refreshing R :
1. A
$←− (Z∗q)n\{(0n)} and B ← non singular (Z∗q)n×m such that A ·B = (0m).
2. M ← non-singular (Z∗q)n×n such that L ·M = A.
3. X ←M ·B and R′ ← R+X.
• Refreshing L :
1. A˜
$←− (Z∗q)n\{(0n)} and B˜ ← non singular (Z∗q)n×m such that A˜ · B˜ = (0m).
2. M˜ ← non-singular (Z∗q)n×n such that M˜ ·R′ = B˜.
3. Y ← A˜ · M˜ and L′ ← L+ Y .
• Output : (L′, R′)
Let Λ = (Encode,Decode) be a (λΛ, 1)-secure leakage-resilient storage scheme and Refresh be a
refreshing protocol. We consider the following experiment Exp, which runs Refresh for ` rounds and lets
the adversary obtain leakage in each round. For refreshing protocol Refresh, a λRefresh-limited adversary
B, ` ∈ N and s $←− (Z∗q)m, we denote the following experiment by Exp(Refresh,Λ)(B, s, `):
1. For a secret s, the initial encoding is generated as (s0L, s
0
R)← Encode(s).
2. For j = 1 to ` run B against the jth round of the refreshing protocol.
3. Return whatever B outputs.
We require that the adversary B outputs a single bit b ∈ {0, 1} upon performing the experiment Exp
using s
$←− {s0, s1} ∈ (Z∗q)m. Now we define leakage-resilient security of a refreshing protocol.
Definition 2.8 ((`,λRefresh, 2)-secure Leakage-Resilient Refreshing Protocol). For a (λΛ, 1)-secure
leakage-resilient storage scheme Λ = (Encode,Decode) with message space (Z∗q)m, Refresh is (`,λRefresh, 2)-
secure leakage-resilient, if for every λRefresh-limited adversary B and any two secrets s0, s1 ∈ (Z∗q)m, the
statistical distance between Exp(Refresh,Λ)(B, s0, `) and Exp(Refresh,Λ)(B, s1, `) is bounded by 2.
Theorem 2.2 ([12]). Let m/3 ≤ n, n ≥ 16 and ` ∈ N. Let n,m and Z∗q be such that Λn,mZ∗q is (λ, )-
secure leakage-resilient storage scheme (Definition 2.4 and Definition 2.6). Then the refreshing protocol
Refreshn,mZ∗q (Definition 2.7) is a (`,λ/2, 
′)-secure leakage-resilient refreshing protocol for Λn,mZ∗q (Definition
2.8) with ′ = 2`q(3qm+mq−n−1).
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3 Continuous After-the-Fact Leakage eCK Model and the eCK
Model
In 2014 Alawatugoda et al. [2] proposed a new security model for key exchange protocols, namely the
generic after-the-fact leakage eCK ((·)AFL-eCK) model which, in addition to the adversarial capabilities
of the eCK model [19], is equipped with an adversary-chosen, efficiently computable, adaptive leakage
function f , enabling the adversary to obtain the leakage of long-term secret keys of protocol principals.
Therefore the (·)AFL-eCK model captures all the attacks captured by the eCK model, and captures the
partial leakage of long-term secret keys due to side-channel attacks.
The eCK Model.
In the eCK model, in sessions where the adversary does not modify the communication between parties
(passive sessions), the adversary is allowed to reveal both ephemeral secrets, long-term secrets, or one of
each from two different parties, whereas in sessions where the adversary may forge the communication of
one of the parties (active sessions), the adversary is allowed to reveal the long-term or ephemeral secret
of the other party. The security challenge is to distinguish the real session key from a random session key,
in an adversary-chosen protocol session.
Generic After-the-Fact Leakage eCK Model.
The generic (·)AFL-eCK model can be instantiated in two different ways which leads to two security
models. Namely, bounded after-the-fact leakage eCK (BAFL-eCK) model and continuous after-the-fact
leakage eCK (CAFL-eCK) model. The BAFL-eCK model allows the adversary to obtain a bounded
amount of leakage of the long-term secret keys of the protocol principals, as well as reveal session keys,
long-term secret keys and ephemeral keys. Differently, the CAFL-eCK model allows the adversary to
continuously obtain arbitrarily large amount of leakage of the long-term secret keys of the protocol
principals, enforcing the restriction that the amount of leakage per observation is bounded.
Below we revisit the definitions of the CAFL-eCK model, and we also recall the definitions of the
eCK model as a comparison to the CAFL-eCK definitions.
3.1 Partner Sessions in the CAFL-eCK Model
Definition 3.1 (Partner sessions in the CAFL-eCK model). Two oracles ΠsU,V and Π
s′
U ′,V ′ are said to
be partners if all of the following hold:
1. both ΠsU,V and Π
s′
U ′,V ′ have computed session keys;
2. messages sent from ΠsU,V and messages received by Π
s′
U ′,V ′ are identical;
3. messages sent from Πs
′
U ′,V ′ and messages received by Π
s
U,V are identical;
4. U ′ = V and V ′ = U ;
5. Exactly one of U and V is the initiator and the other is the responder.
The protocol is said to be correct if two partner oracles compute identical session keys.
The definition of partner sessions is the same in the eCK model.
3.2 Leakage in the CAFL-eCK Model
A realistic way in which side-channel attacks can be mounted against key exchange protocols seems to be
to obtain the leakage information from the protocol computations which use the secret keys. Following
the previously used premise in other leakage models that “only computation leaks information”, leakage
is modelled where any computation takes place using secret keys. In normal protocol models, by issuing
a Send query, the adversary will get a protocol message which is computed according to the normal
protocol computations. Sending an adversary-chosen, efficiently computable adaptive leakage function
with the Send query thus reflects the concept “only computation leaks information”.
A tuple of t adaptively chosen efficiently computable leakage functions f = (f1j , f2j , . . . , ftj) are
introduced; j indicates the jth leakage occurrence and the size t of the tuple is protocol-specific. A key
exchange protocol may use more than one cryptographic primitive where each primitive uses a distinct
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secret key. Hence, it is necessary to address the leakage of secret keys from each of those primitives.
Otherwise, some cryptographic primitives which have been used to construct a key exchange protocol may
be stateful and the secret key is encoded into number of parts. The execution of a stateful cryptographic
primitive is split into a number of sequential stages and each of these stages uses one part of the secret
key. Hence, it is necessary to address the leakage of each of these encoded parts of the secret key.
Note that the adversary is restricted to obtain leakage from each key part independently: the adversary
cannot use the output of f1j as an input parameter to the f2j and so on. This prevents the adversary
from observing a connection between each part.
3.3 Adversarial Powers of the CAFL-eCK Model
The adversary A controls the whole network. A interacts with a set of oracles which represent protocol
instances. The following query allows the adversary to run the protocol.
• Send(U, V, s,m, f) query: The oracle ΠsU,V , computes the next protocol message according to the
protocol specification and sends it to the adversary A, along with the leakage f(skU ). A can also
use this query to activate a new protocol instance as an initiator with blank m.
In the eCK model Send query is same as the above except the leakage function f .
The following set of queries allow the adversary A to compromise certain session specific ephemeral
secrets and long-term secrets from the protocol principals.
• SessionKeyReveal(U, V, s) query: A is given the session key of the oracle ΠsU,V .
• EphemeralKeyReveal(U, V, s) query: A is given the ephemeral keys (per-session randomness) of
the oracle ΠsU,V .
• Corrupt(U) query: A is given the long-term secrets of the principal U . This query does not reveal
any session keys or ephemeral keys to A.
SessionKeyReveal, EphemeralKeyReveal and Corrupt (Long-term key reveal) queries are the same in
the eCK model.
Once the oracle ΠsU,V has accepted a session key, asking the following query the adversary A attempt
to distinguish it from a random session key. The Test query is used to formalize the notion of the
semantic security of a key exchange protocol.
• Test(U, s) query: When A asks the Test query, the challenger first chooses a random bit b $←− {0, 1}
and if b = 1 then the actual session key is returned to A, otherwise a random string chosen from
the same session key space is returned to A. This query is only allowed to be asked once across all
sessions.
The Test query is the same in the eCK model.
3.4 Freshness Definition of the CAFL-eCK Model
Definition 3.2 (λ−CAFL-eCK-freshness). Let λ = (λ1, . . . , λt) be a vector of t elements (same size as
f in Send query). An oracle ΠsU,V is said to be λ− CAFL-eCK-fresh if and only if:
1. The oracle ΠsU,V or its partner, Π
s′
V,U (if it exists) has not been asked a SessionKeyReveal.
2. If the partner Πs
′
V,U exists, none of the following combinations have been asked:
(a) Corrupt(U) and EphemeralKeyReveal(U, V, s).
(b) Corrupt(V ) and EphemeralKeyReveal(V,U, s′).
3. If the partner Πs
′
V,U does not exist, none of the following combinations have been asked:
(a) Corrupt(V ).
(b) Corrupt(U) and EphemeralKeyReveal(U, V, s).
4. For each Send(U, ·, ·, ·, f) query, size of the output of |fij(skU i)| ≤ λi.
5. For each Send(V, ·, ·, ·, f) queries, size of the output of |fij(skV i)| ≤ λi.
The eCK-freshness is slightly different from the λ− CAFL-eCK-freshness by stripping off points 4
and 5.
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3.5 Security Game and Security Definition of the CAFL-eCK Model
Definition 3.3 (λ−CAFL-eCK security game). Security of a key exchange protocol in the CAFL-eCK
model is defined using the following security game, which is played by the adversary A against the
protocol challenger.
• Stage 1: A may ask any of Send, SessionKeyReveal, EphemeralKeyReveal and Corrupt queries
to any oracle at will.
• Stage 2: A chooses a λ− CAFL-eCK-fresh oracle and asks a Test query. The challenger chooses
a random bit b
$←− {0, 1}, and if b = 1 then the actual session key is returned to A, otherwise a
random string chosen from the same session key space is returned to A.
• Stage 3: A continues asking Send, SessionKeyReveal, EphemeralKeyReveal and Corrupt queries.
A may not ask a query that violates the λ− CAFL-eCK-freshness of the test session.
• Stage 4: At some point A outputs the bit b′ ← {0, 1} which is its guess of the value b on the test
session. A wins if b′ = b.
The eCK security game is same as the above, except that in Stage 2 and Stage 3 eCK-fresh oracles
are chosen instead of λ− CAFL-eCK-fresh oracles. SuccA is the event that the adversary A wins the
security game in Definition 3.3.
Definition 3.4 (λ−CAFL-eCK-security). A protocol pi is said to be λ−CAFL-eCK secure if there is no
adversary A that can win the λ− CAFL-eCK security game with significant advantage. The advantage
of an adversary A is defined as Advλ−CAFL-eCKpi (A) = |2 Pr(SuccA)− 1|.
3.6 Practical Interpretation of Security of CAFL-eCK Model
We review the relationship between the CAFL-eCK model and real world attack scenarios.
• Active adversarial capabilities: Send queries address the powers of an active adversary who
can control the message flow over the network. In the previous security models, this property is
addressed by introducing the send query.
• Side-channel attacks: Leakage functions are embedded with the Send query. Thus, assuming
that the leakage happens when computations take place in principals, a wide variety of side-channel
attacks such as timing attacks, EM emission based attacks, power analysis attacks, which are
based on continuous leakage of long-term secrets are addressed. This property is not addressed
in the earlier security models such as the BR models, the CK model, the eCK model and the
Moriyama-Okamoto model.
• Malware attacks: EphemeralKeyReveal queries cover the malware attacks which steal stored
ephemeral keys, given that the long-term keys may be securely stored separately from the ephemeral
keys in places such as smart cards or hardware security modules. Separately, Corrupt queries
address malware attacks which steal the long-term secret keys of protocol principals. In the previous
security models, this property is addressed by introducing the ephemeral-key reveal, session-state
reveal and corrupt queries.
• Weak random number generators: Due to weak random number generators, the adversary
may correctly determine the produced random number. EphemeralKeyReveal query addresses
situations where the adversary can get the ephemeral secrets. In the previous security models, this
property is addressed by introducing the ephemeral-key reveal query or the session-state reveal
query.
4 Protocol P1: Simple eCK-Secure Key Exchange
The motivation of LaMacchia et al. [19] in designing the eCK model was that an adversary should have
to compromise both the long-term and ephemeral secret keys of a party in order to recover the session
key. In this section we look at construction paradigms of eCK-secure key exchange protocols, because our
aim is to construct a CAFL-eCK-secure key exchange protocol using a eCK-secure key exchange protocol
as the underlying primitive.
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In the NAXOS protocol, [19], this is accomplished using what is now called the “NAXOS trick”: a
“pseudo” ephemeral key e˜sk is computed as the hash of the long-term key lsk and the actual ephemeral key
esk: e˜sk ← H(esk, lsk). The value e˜sk is never stored, and thus in the eCK model the adversary must
learn both esk and lsk in order to be able to compute e˜sk. The initiator must compute e˜sk = H(esk, lsk)
twice: once when sending its Diffie–Hellman ephemeral public key ge˜sk, and once when computing the
Diffie–Hellman shared secrets from the received values. This is to avoid storing a single value that, when
compromised, can be used to compute the session key.
Moving to the leakage-resilient setting requires rethinking the NAXOS trick. Alawatugoda et al. [2]
have proposed a generic construction of an after-the-fact leakage eCK ((·)AFL-eCK)-secure key exchange
protocol, which uses a leakage-resilient NAXOS trick. The leakage-resilient NAXOS trick is obtained
using a decryption function of an after-the-fact leakage-resilient public key encryption scheme. A concrete
construction of a BAFL-eCK-secure protocol is possible since there exists a bounded after-the-fact
leakage-resilient public key encryption scheme which can be used to obtain the required leakage-resilient
NAXOS trick, but it is not possible to construct a CAFL-eCK-secure protocol since there is no continuous
after-the-fact leakage-resilient scheme available. Therefore, an attempt to construct a CAFL-eCK-secure
key exchange protocol using the leakage-resilient NAXOS approach is not likely at this stage.
4.1 Description of Protocol P1
Our aim is to construct an eCK-secure key exchange protocol which does not use the NAXOS trick, but
combines long-term secret keys and ephemeral secret keys to compute the session key, in a way that
guarantees eCK security of the protocol. The protocol P1 shown in Table 2 is a Diffie–Hellman-type [10]
key agreement protocol. Let G be a group of prime order q and generator g. After exchanging the public
values both principals compute a Diffie–Hellman-type shared secret, and then compute the session key
using a random oracle H. We use the random oracle because otherwise it is not possible to perfectly
simulate the interaction between the adversary and the protocol, in a situation where the simulator does
not know a long-term secret key of a protocol principal.
Alice (Initiator) Bob (Responder)
Initial Setup
a
$←− Z∗q , A← ga b $←− Z∗q , B ← gb
Protocol Execution
x
$←− Z∗q , X ← gx Alice,X−−−−−→ y $←− Z∗q , Y ← gy
Bob,Y←−−−−
Z1 ← Ba, Z2 ← Bx Z ′1 ← Ab, Z ′2 ← Xb
Z3 ← Y a, Z4 ← Y x Z ′3 ← Ay, Z ′4 ← Xy
K ← H(Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4, Alice,X,Bob, Y ) K ← H(Z ′1, Z ′2, Z ′3, Z ′4, Alice,X,Bob, Y )
K is the session key
Table 2: Protocol P1
In order to compute the session key, protocol P1 combines four components (Z1 ← Ba, Z3 ← Y a,
Z4 ← Y x, Z2 ← Bx) using the random oracle function H. These four components cannot be recovered by
the attacker without both the ephemeral and long-term secret keys of at least one protocol principal,
which allows a proof of eCK security.
Though the design of protocol P1 is quite straightforward, we could not find it given explicitly in
the literature: most work on the design of eCK-secure protocols seeks to create more efficient protocols
than this naive protocol, but the naive protocol is more appropriate for building into a leakage-resilient
protocol.
Leakage-Resilient Rethinking of Protocol P1.
Moving to the leakage-resilient setting requires rethinking the exponentiation computation in a leakage-
resilient manner. Since there exist leakage-resilient encoding schemes and leakage-resilient refreshing
protocols for them (Definition 2.4 and 2.7) our aim is computing the required exponentiations in a
leakage-resilient manner using the available leakage-resilient storage and refreshing schemes. For now
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we look at the eCK security of protocol P1, and later in Section 5 we will look at the leakage-resilient
modification to protocol P1 in detail.
4.2 Security Analysis of Protocol P1
Theorem 4.1. If H is modeled as a random oracle and G is a group of prime order q and generator g,
where the gap Diffie–Hellman (GDH) problem is hard, then protocol P1 is secure in the eCK model.
Let U = {U1, . . . , UNP } be a set of NP parties. Each party Ui owns at most NS number of protocol
sessions. Let A be an adversary against protocol P1. Then, B is an algorithm which is constructed using
the adversary A, against the GDH problem such that the advantage of A against the eCK-security of
protocol P1, AdveCKP1 is:
AdveCKP1 (A) ≤ max
(
N2PN
2
S
(
PrGDHg,q (B)
)
, N2P
(
PrGDHg,q (B)
)
, N2PNS
(
PrGDHg,q (B)
)
,
N2PNS
(
PrGDHg,q (B)
)
, N2PNS
(
PrGDHg,q (B)
)
, N2P
(
PrGDHg,q (B)
))
.
Proof Sketch: Let A denote the event that A wins the eCK challenge. Let H denote the event that A
queries the random oracle H with (CDH(A∗, B∗),CDH(B∗, X∗),CDH(A∗, Y ∗),CDH(X∗, Y ∗), initiator,
X, responder, Y ), where A∗, B∗ are the long-term public-keys of the two partners to the test session, and
X∗, Y ∗ are their ephemeral public keys for this session. Note that when A = ga, B = gb,CDH(A,B) = gab;
also initiator is the initiator of the session and responder is the responder of the session.
Pr(A) ≤ Pr(A ∧H) + Pr(A ∧ H¯) .
Without the event H occurring, the session key given as the answer to the Test query is random-
looking to the adversary, and therefore Pr(A|H¯) = 12 . Pr(A ∧ H¯) = Pr(A|H¯) Pr(H¯), and therefore
Pr(A ∧ H¯) ≤ 12 . Hence,
Pr(A) ≤ 1
2
+ Pr(A ∧H),
that is Pr(A ∧H) = AdveCKP1 (A). Henceforth, the event (A ∧H) is denoted as A∗.
Note. Let B be an algorithm against a GDH challenger. B receives L = g`,W = gw as the GDH challenge
and B has access to a DDH oracle, which outputs 1 if the input is a tuple of (gα, gβ , gαβ). Ω : G×G→ G
is a random function known only to B, such that Ω(Φ,Θ) = Ω(Θ,Φ) for all Φ,Θ ∈ G. B will use Ω(Φ,Θ)
as CDH(Φ,Θ) in situations where B does not know logg Φ and logg Θ. Except with negligible probability,
A will not recognize that Ω(Φ,Θ) is being used as CDH(Φ,Θ).
We construct the algorithm B using A as a sub-routine. B receives L = g`,W = gw as the GDH
challenge. We consider the following mutually exclusive events, under two main cases:
1. A partner to the test session exists: the adversary is allowed to corrupt both principals or reveal
ephemeral keys from both sessions of the test session.
(a) Adversary corrupts both the owner and partner principals to the test session - Event E1a
(b) Adversary corrupts neither owner nor partner principal to the test session - Event E1b
(c) Adversary corrupts the owner to the test session, but does not corrupt the partner to the test
session - Event E1c
(d) Adversary corrupts the partner to the test session, but does not corrupt the owner to the test
session - Event E1d
2. A partner to the test session does not exist: the adversary is not allowed to corrupt the intended
partner principal to the test session.
(a) Adversary corrupts the owner to the test session - Event E2a
(b) Adversary does not corrupt the owner to the test session - Event E2b
In any other situation the test session is no longer fresh. If event A∗ happens at least one of the following
event should happen.
[(E1a ∧A∗), (E1b ∧A∗), (E1c ∧A∗), (E1d ∧A∗), (E2a ∧A∗), (E2b ∧A∗)]
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Hence,
AdveCKP1 ≤ max
(
Pr(E1a ∧A∗),Pr(E1b ∧A∗),Pr(E1c ∧A∗),Pr(E1d ∧A∗),Pr(E2a ∧A∗),Pr(E2b ∧A∗)
)
.
Complete security analysis of each event is described in Appendix A.
5 Protocol P2: A Leakage-Resilient Version of P1
Protocol P1 is an eCK-secure key exchange protocol (Theorem 4.1). The eCK model considers an
environment where partial information leakage does not take place. Following the concept that only
computation leaks information, we now assume that the leakage of long-term secret keys happens when
computations are performed using them. Then, instead of the non-leakage eCK model which we used
for the security proof of protocol P1, we consider the CAFL-eCK model which additionally allows the
adversary to obtain continuous leakage of long-term secret keys.
Our idea is to perform the computations which use long-term secret keys (exponentiation operations)
in such a way that the resulting leakage from the long-term secrets should not leak sufficient information
to reveal them to the adversary. To overcome that challenge we use a leakage-resilient storage scheme
and a leakage-resilient refreshing protocol, and modify the architecture of protocol P1, in such a way
that the secret keys s are encoded into two portions sL, sR, Exponentiations are computed using two
portions sL, sR instead of directly using s, and the two portions sL, sR are being refreshed continuously.
Thus, we add leakage resiliency to the eCK-secure protocol P1 and construct protocol P2 such that it is
leakage-resilient and eCK-secure.
Obtaining Leakage Resiliency by Encoding Secrets.
In this setting we encode a secret s using an Encode function of a leakage-resilient storage scheme
Λ = (Encode,Decode). So the secret s is encoded as (sL, sR) ← Encode(s). As mentioned in the
Definition 2.4.1 the leakage-resilient storage scheme randomly chooses sL and then computes sR such
that sL · sR = s. We define the tuple leakage parameter λ = (λ1, λ2) as follows: λ-limited adversary A
sends a leakage function f = (f1j , f2j) and obtains at most λ1, λ2 amount of leakage from each of the two
encodings of the secret s respectively: f1j(sL) and f2j(sR).
As mentioned in Definition 2.7, the leakage-resilient storage scheme can continuously refresh the
encodings of the secret. Therefore, after executing the refreshing protocol it outputs new random-looking
encodings of the same secret. So for the λ-limited adversary again the situation is as before. Thus,
refreshing the encodings will help to obtain leakage resilience over a number of protocol executions.
The computation of exponentiations is also split into two parts. Let G be a group of prime order
q with generator g. Let s
$←− Z∗q be a long-term secret key and E = ge be a received ephemeral value.
Then, the value Z needs to be computed as Z ← Es. In the leakage-resilient setting, in the initial
setup the secret key is encoded as sL, sR ← Encoden,1Z∗q (s). So the vector sL = (sL1, · · · , sLn) and the
vector sR = (sR1, · · · , sRn) are such that s = sL1sR1 + · · · + sLnsRn. Then the computation of Es
can be performed as two component-wise computations as follows: compute the intermediate vector
T ← EsL = (EsL1 , · · · , EsLn) and then compute the element Z ← T sR = EsL1sR1EsL2sR2 · · ·EsL1sR1 =
EsL1sR1+···+sLnsRn = Es.
5.1 Description of Protocol P2
Using the above ideas, by encoding the secret using a leakage-resilient storage scheme, and refreshing the
encoded secret using a refreshing protocol, it is possible to hide the secret from a λ-limited adversary.
Further, it is possible to successfully compute the exponentiation using the encoded secrets. We now
use these primitives to construct a CAFL-eCK-secure key exchange protocol, using an eCK-secure key
exchange protocol as an underlying primitive.
Let Λn,1Z∗q = (Encode
n,1
Z∗q ,Decode
n,1
Z∗q ) be the leakage-resilient storage scheme which is used to encode
secret keys and Refreshn,1Z∗q be the (`,λ, )-secure leakage-resilient refreshing protocol of Λ
n,1
Z∗q .
As we can see, the obvious way of key generation (initial setup) in a protocol principal of this
protocol is as follows: first pick a
$←− Z∗q as the long-term secret key, then encode the secret key as
(a0L, a
0
R) ← Encoden,1Z∗q (a), then compute the long-term public key A = ga using the two encodings
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(a0L, a
0
R), and finally erase a from the memory. The potential threat to that key generation mechanism is
that even though the long-term secret key a is erased from the memory, it might not be properly erased
and can be leaked to the adversary during the key generation. In order to avoid such a vulnerability, we
randomly picks two values a0L
$←− (Z∗q)n\{(0n)}, a0R $←− (Z∗q)n×1\{(0n×1)} and use them as the encodings
of the long-term secret key a of a protocol principal. As explained earlier, we use a0L, a
0
R to compute
the corresponding long-term public key A in two steps as a′ ← ga0L and A← a′a0R . Thus, it is possible
to avoid exposing the un-encoded secret key a at any point of time in the key generation and hence
avoid leaking directly from a at the key generation step. Further, the random vector a0L is multiplied
with the random vector a0R, such that a = a
0
L · a0R, which will give a random integer a in the group Z∗q .
Therefore, this approach is same as picking a
$←− Z∗q at first and then encode, but in the reverse order.
During protocol execution both a0L, a
0
R are continuously refreshed and refreshed encodings a
j
L, a
j
R are
used to exponentiation computations.
Table 3 shows protocol P2. In this setting leakage of a long-term secret key does not happen directly
from the long-term secret key itself, but from the two encodings of the long-term secret key (the leakage
function f = (f1j , f2j) directs to the each individual encoding). During the exponentiation computations
and the refreshing operation collectively at most λ = (λ1, λ2) leakage is allowed to the adversary from
each of the two portions independently. Then, the two portions of the encoded long-term secret key
are refreshed and in the next protocol session another λ-bounded leakage is allowed. Thus, continuous
leakage is allowed.
Alice (Initiator) Bob (Responder)
Initial Setup
a0L
$←− (Z∗q)n\{(0n)}, a0R $←− (Z∗q)n×1\{(0n×1)} b0L $←− (Z∗q)n\{(0n)}, b0R $←− (Z∗q)n×1\{(0n×1)}
a′ ← ga0L , A← (a′)a0R b′ ← gbjL , B ← (b′)b0R
Protocol Execution
x
$←− Z∗q , X ← gx Alice,X−−−−−→ y $←− Z∗q , Y ← gy
Bob,Y←−−−−
T1 ← BajL , Z1 ← T a
j
R
1 T3 ← Ab
j
L , Z ′1 ← T b
j
R
3
Z2 ← Bx T4 ← XbjL , Z ′2 ← T b
j
R
4
T2 ← Y ajL , Z3 ← T a
j
R
2 Z
′
3 ← Ay
Z4 ← Y x Z ′4 ← Xy
(aj+1L , a
j+1
R )← Refreshn,1Z∗q (a
j
L, a
j
R) (b
j+1
L , b
j+1
R )← Refreshn,1Z∗q (b
j
L, b
j
R)
K ← H(Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4, Alice,X,Bob, Y ) K ← H(Z ′1, Z ′2, Z ′3, Z ′4, Alice,X,Bob, Y )
K is the session key
Table 3: Concrete construction of Protocol P2
5.2 Security Analysis of Protocol P2
Theorem 5.1. If the underlying refreshing protocol Refreshn,1Z∗q is (`,λ, )-secure leakage-resilient refreshing
protocol of the leakage-resilient storage scheme Λn,1Z∗q and the underlying key exchange protocol P1 is eCK-
secure key exchange protocol, then protocol P2 is λ-CAFL-eCK-secure.
Let A be an adversary against the key exchange protocol P2. Then the advantage of A against the
CAFL-eCK-security of protocol P2 is:
Advλ−CAFL-eCKP2 (A) ≤ NP
(
AdveCKP1 (A) + 
)
.
Proof. The proof proceeds by a sequence of games.
• Game 1. This is the original game.
• Game 2. Same as Game 1 with the following exception: before A begins, an identity of a random
principal U∗ $←− {U1, . . . , UNP } is chosen. Challenger expects that the adversary will issue the Test
for a session which involves the principal U∗ (Π·U∗,· or Π
·
·,U∗). If not the challenger aborts the game.
12
• Game 3. Same as Game 2 with the following exception: challenger picks a random s $←− Z∗q and
uses encodings of s to simulate the adversarial leakage queries f = (f1j , f2j) of the principal U
∗.
We now analyze the adversary’s advantage of distinguishing each game from the previous game. Let
AdvGame x(A) denote the advantage of the adversary A winning Game x.
Game 1 is the original game. Hence,
AdvGame 1(A) = Advλ−CAFL-eCKP2 (A) . (1)
Game 1 and Game 2. The probability of Game 2 to be halted due to incorrect choice of the test
session is 1− 1NP . Unless the incorrect choice happens, Game 2 is identical to Game 1. Hence,
AdvGame 2(A) = 1
NP
AdvGame 1(A) . (2)
Game 2 and Game 3. We construct an algorithm B against a leakage-resilient refreshing protocol
challenger of Refreshn,1Z∗q , using the adversary A as a subroutine.
The (`,λ, )-Refreshn,1Z∗q refreshing protocol challenger chooses s0, s1
$←− Z∗q and sends them to the
algorithm B. Further, the refreshing protocol challenger randomly chooses s $←− {s0, s1} and uses s as
the secret to compute the leakage from encodings of s. Let λ = (λ1, λ2) be the leakage bound and the
refreshing protocol challenger continuously refresh the two encodings of the secret s.
When the algorithm B gets the challenge of s0, s1 from the refreshing protocol challenger, B uses s0
as the secret key of the protocol principal U∗ and computes the corresponding public key. For all other
protocol principals B sets secret/public key pairs by itself. Using the setup keys, B computes answers
to all the queries from A and simulates the view of CAFL-eCK challenger of protocol P2. B computes
the leakage of secret keys by computing the adversarial leakage function f on the corresponding secret
key (encodings of secret key), except the secret key of the protocol principal U∗. In order to obtain the
leakage of the secret key of U∗, algorithm B queries the refreshing protocol challenger with the adversarial
leakage function f , and passes that leakage to A.
If the secret s chosen by the refreshing protocol challenger is s0, the leakage of the secret key of U
∗
simulated by B (with the aid of the refreshing protocol challenger) is the real leakage. Then the simulation
is identical to Game 2. Otherwise, the leakage of the secret key of U∗ simulated by B is a leakage of a
random value. Then the simulation is identical to Game 3. Hence,
|AdvGame 2(A)−AdvGame 3(A)| ≤  . (3)
Game 3. Since the leakage is computed using a random s value, the adversary A will not get any
advantage due to the leakage. Therefore, the advantage A will get is same as the advantage that A
has against eCK challenger of protocol P1. Because both P1 and P2 are effectively doing the same
computation, regardless of the protocol P2, and with no useful leakage the CAFL-eCK model is same as
the eCK model. Hence,
AdvGame 3(A) = AdveCKP1 (A) . (4)
We find,
Advλ−CAFL-eCKP2 (A) ≤ NP
(
AdveCKP1 (A) + 
)
.
5.3 Leakage Tolerance of Protocol P2
The order of the group G is q. Let m = 1 in the leakage-resilient storage scheme Λn,1Z∗q . According to
the Lemma 2.1, if m < n/20, then the leakage parameter for the leakage-resilient storage scheme is
λΛ = (0.3n log q, 0.3n log q). Let n = 21, then λΛ = (6.3 log q, 6.3 log q) bits. According to the Theorem
2.2, if m/3 ≤ n and n ≥ 16, the refreshing protocol Refreshn,1Z∗q of the leakage-resilient storage scheme Λ
n,1
Z∗q
is tolerant to (continuous) leakage up to λRefresh = λΛ/2 = (3.15 log q, 3.15 log q) bits, per occurrence.
When a secret key s (of size log q bits) of protocol P2 is encoded into two parts, the left part sL will
be n · log q = 21 log q bits and the right part sR will be n · 1 · log q = 21 log q bits. For a tuple leakage
function f = (f1j , f2j) (each leakage function f(·) for each of the two parts sL and sR), there exists a
tuple leakage bound λ = (λ, λ) for each leakage function f(·), such that λ = 3.15 log q bits, per occurrence,
which is 3.15 log q21 log q × 100% = 15% of the size of a part. The overall leakage amount is unbounded since
continuous leakage is allowed.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper we answered that open problem of constructing a concrete CAFL-eCK secure key exchange
protocol by using a leakage-resilient storage scheme and its refreshing protocol. The main technique used
to achieve after-the-fact leakage resilience is encoding the secret key into two parts and only allowing the
independent leakage from each part. As future work it is worthwhile to investigate whether there are
other techniques to achieve after-the-fact leakage resilience, rather than encoding the secret into parts.
Moving to the standard model is another possible research direction. Strengthening the security model,
by not just restricting to the independent leakage from each part, would be a more challenging research
direction.
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A Analysis of the Events of the Proof of Theorem 4.1
A.1 Event (E1a ∧A∗)
A.1.1 Event (E1a ∧A∗) : setup.
B establishes NP number of honest parties which B assigns long-term secret/public key pairs. For each
honest party B maintains at most NS number of sessions. B chooses two distinct random principals
U∗, V ∗ $←− {U1, . . . , UNP } and two random numbers s∗, t∗ $←− {1, . . . , NS}. B guesses the the oracle Πs
∗
U∗,V ∗
as the target session and the oracle Πt
∗
V ∗,U∗ as the partner to the target session. For the rest of this event
consider A as the long-term public key or U∗ and B as the long-term public key of V ∗.
A.1.2 Event (E1a ∧A∗) : simulation.
• Send: On behalf of honest protocol principals B selects ephemeral secret/public key pairs according
to the protocol specification. B uses X = L = g` as the ephemeral public key of Πs∗U∗,V ∗ and
Y = W = gw as the ephemeral public key of Πt
∗
V ∗,U∗ . Note that B does not possess the ephemeral
secret keys of oracles Πs
∗
U∗,V ∗ and Π
t∗
V ∗,U∗ .
• Corrupt: B answers all Corrupt queries faithfully.
• EphemeralKeyReveal: If EphemeralKeyReveal query to the oracle Πs∗U∗,V ∗ or Πt
∗
V ∗,U∗ is asked, B
aborts the simulation. Otherwise answers all EphemeralKeyReveal queries faithfully.
• SessionKeyReveal: B answers all SessionKeyReveal queries faithfully.
• H(pos1, pos2, pos3, pos4, initiator, I, responder, J): B simulates the random oracle H in the usual
way. If A asks a H query such that pos4 = CDH(L,W ), B aborts the game and answers the GDH
challenge. (B can find whether pos4 = CDH(L,W ) or not by using DDH oracle)
• Test: If the Test query is not asked to Πs∗U∗,V ∗ and partner to Πt
∗
V ∗,U∗ , B aborts the simulation.
Otherwise, B obtains K ← H(CDH(A,B),CDH(B,L),CDH(A,W ),Ω(L,W ), U∗, L, V ∗,W ) (con-
sidering U∗ is the initiator, otherwise exchange the positions of (CDH(B,L), CDH(A,W )), (U∗,
V ∗) and (L,W ) respectively), and uses K as the real session key.
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A.1.3 Event (E1a ∧A∗) : analysis.
The simulation of the view of eCK challenger to the adversary A is perfect except with negligible
probability. The probability that A selects the oracles Πs∗U∗,V ∗ and Πt
∗
V ∗,U∗ as the test session and its
partner is at least 1
N2PN
2
S
, and the probability of event (E1a ∧A∗) is non-negligible. According to the
event A∗, A queries the random oracle H with (CDH(A,B),CDH(B,L),CDH(A,W ),CDH(L,W ), U∗,
L, V ∗,W ). Hence, B can answer the GDH challenge with the probability,
PrGDHg,q (B) ≥
Pr (E1a ∧A∗)
N2PN
2
S
.
Thus,
Pr (E1a ∧A∗) ≤ N2PN2S
(
PrGDHg,q (B)
)
. (5)
A.2 Event (E1b ∧A∗)
A.2.1 Event (E1b ∧A∗) : setup.
B establishes NP number of honest parties. For each honest party B maintains at most NS number
of sessions. B chooses two distinct random principals U∗, V ∗ $←− {U1, . . . , UNP }. B sets A = L = g` as
the long-term public key of U∗ and B = W = gw as the long-term public key of V ∗. For the rest of the
parties B sets long-term secret/public key pairs according to the protocol specification. Note that B does
not possess the long-term secret keys of U∗ and V ∗.
A.2.2 Event (E1b ∧A∗) : simulation.
• Send: On behalf of honest protocol principals B selects ephemeral secret/public key pairs according
to the protocol specification.
• Corrupt: If Corrupt query to U∗ or V ∗ is asked, B aborts the simulation. Otherwise B answers all
Corrupt queries faithfully.
• EphemeralKeyReveal: B answers all EphemeralKeyReveal queries faithfully.
• SessionKeyReveal: B answers all SessionKeyReveal queries as follows:
1. If A asks a SessionKeyReveal query to an oracle where both U∗ and V ∗ are involved (Π·U∗,V ∗
or Π·V ∗,U∗), B uses the function Ω to compute a value to replace CDH(L,W ) as Ω(L,W ).
2. If A asks a SessionKeyReveal query to an oracle which is owned by principal U∗ (or V ∗)
and does not have a partner (where A sends E having come from the partner and B does not
posses the secret key corresponds to E), B uses the function Ω to compute a value to replace
CDH(L,E) (or CDH(W,E)) as Ω(L,E) (or Ω(W,E)).
3. For any other SessionKeyReveal query B can easily compute corresponding four Diffie-Hellman
exponentiations, because B knows the long-term secret keys of other principals and ephemeral
secret keys of partnered oracles.
Then B queries the random oracle H with the corresponding values and answers the SessionKeyReveal
query. Since B uses the function Ω to compute values to replace Diffie-Hellman exponentiations,
in places where it does not possess both long-term and ephemeral secret keys, B can maintain
consistency when querying the random oracle H.
• H(pos1, pos2, pos3, pos4, initiator, I, responder, J):
1. If initiator, responder /∈ {U∗, V ∗}, B simulates the random oracle H in the usual way.
2. If initiator = U∗, B checks the random oracle for a previously asked query, matching with the
current one. If a match found, answers with the corresponding random-oracle value. Otherwise:
– If B found all the positions except position 3 of a previously asked random oracle query
respectively matching with the positions of the current random oracle query, B queries
the DDH oracle with (L, J, pos3), if the output is 1 and position 3 of the previously asked
random oracle query equals to Ω(L, J), answers with the corresponding random-oracle
value in the table. Else answers with a random value and stores the query and the answer
in the random oracle table.
16
– Else, answers with a random value and stores the query and the answer in the random
oracle table.
Similarly when initiator = V ∗.
3. If responder = V ∗, B checks the random oracle for a previously asked query, matching with the
current one. If a match found, answers with the corresponding random-oracle value. Otherwise:
– If B found all the positions except position 2 of a previously asked random oracle query
respectively matching with the positions of the current random oracle query, B queries
the DDH oracle with (W, I, pos2), if the output is 1 and position 2 of the previously asked
random oracle query equals to Ω(W, I), answers with the corresponding random-oracle
value in the table. Else answers with a random value and stores the query and the answer
in the random oracle table.
– Else, answers with a random value and stores the query and the answer in the random
oracle table.
Similarly when responder = U∗.
4. If initiator ∈ {U∗, V ∗} and responder ∈ {U∗, V ∗} and A asks a H query such that pos1 =
CDH(L,W ), B aborts the game and answers the GDH challenge. (B can find whether
pos1 = CDH(L,W ) or not by using DDH oracle)
• Test: If the Test query is not asked to an oracle where both U∗ and V ∗ involve (Π·U∗,V ∗ or
Π·V ∗,U∗), B aborts the simulation. Otherwise, B obtains K ← H(Ω(L,W ),CDH(W,X),CDH(L, Y ),
CDH(X,Y ), U∗, X, V ∗, Y ) (considering U∗ is the initiator, otherwise exchange the positions of
(CDH(W,X), CDH(L, Y )), (U∗, V ∗) and (X,Y ) respectively), and uses K as the real session key.
A.2.3 Event (E1b ∧A∗) : analysis.
The simulation of the view of eCK challenger to the adversary A is perfect except with negligible
probability. The probability that A selects an oracle where both U∗ and V ∗ involve (Π·U∗,V ∗ or Π·V ∗,U∗)
as the test session is at least 1
N2P
, and the probability of event (E1b ∧A∗) is non-negligible. According to
the event A∗, A queries the random oracle H with (CDH(L,W ),CDH(W,X),CDH(L, Y ),CDH(X,Y ),
U∗, X, V ∗, Y ). Hence, B can answer the GDH challenge with the probability,
PrGDHg,q (B) ≥
Pr (E1b ∧A∗)
N2P
.
Thus,
Pr (E1b ∧A∗) ≤ N2P
(
PrGDHg,q (B)
)
. (6)
A.3 Event (E1c ∧A∗)
A.3.1 Event (E1c ∧A∗) : setup.
B establishes NP number of honest parties. For each honest party B maintains at most NS number of
sessions. B chooses two distinct random principals U∗, V ∗ $←− {U1, . . . , UNP }. B sets B = W = gw as the
long-term public key of V ∗. For the rest of the parties B sets long-term secret/public key pairs according
to the protocol specification. Note that B does not possess the long-term secret keys of V ∗. B chooses a
random number s∗ $←− {1, . . . , NS} and chooses the oracle Πs∗U∗,V ∗ as the target session.
A.3.2 Event (E1c ∧A∗) : simulation.
Note. In this simulation we assume that U∗ is the initiator of the target session. It is possible to
easily simulate the case where U∗ is the responder as follows: In a place we consider the random oracle
query H(CDH(A,B),Ω(W,L),CDH(A, Y ),CDH(X,Y ), U∗, L, V ∗, Y ), exchange the positions of (Ω(W,L),
CDH(A, Y )), (U∗, V ∗) and (X,Y ) respectively. Particularly, in the simulation of Test query and in the
simulation of the point 4 of H query checks for pos3 = CDH(W,L).
• Send: On behalf of honest protocol principals B selects ephemeral secret/public key pairs according
to the protocol specification. B uses X = L = g` as the ephemeral public key of Πs∗U∗,V ∗ . Note that
B does not posses the ephemeral secret key of oracle Πs∗U∗,V ∗ .
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• Corrupt: If Corrupt query to V ∗ is asked, B aborts the simulation. Otherwise B answers all
Corrupt queries faithfully.
• EphemeralKeyReveal: If EphemeralKeyReveal query to Πs∗U∗,V ∗ is asked, B aborts the simulation.
Otherwise B answers all EphemeralKeyReveal queries faithfully.
• SessionKeyReveal: B answers all SessionKeyReveal queries as follows:
1. If A asks a SessionKeyReveal query to an oracle which is owned by principal V ∗ and does
not have a partner (where A sends E having come from the partner and B does not posses the
secret key corresponds to E), B uses the function Ω to compute a value to replace CDH(W,E)
as Ω(W,E).
2. For any other SessionKeyReveal query B can easily compute corresponding four Diffie-Hellman
exponentiations, because B knows the long-term secret keys of other principals and ephemeral
secret keys of partnered oracles.
Then B queries the random oracle H with the corresponding values and answers the SessionKeyReveal
query. Since B uses the function Ω to compute values to replace Diffie-Hellman exponentiations,
in places where it does not possess both long-term and ephemeral secret keys, B can maintain
consistency when querying the random oracle H.
• H(pos1, pos2, pos3, pos4, initiator, I, responder, J):
1. If initiator, responder /∈ {V ∗}, B simulates the random oracle H in the usual way.
2. If initiator = V ∗, B checks the random oracle for a previously asked query, matching with the
current one. If a match found, answers with the corresponding random-oracle value. Otherwise:
– If B found all the positions except position 3 of a previously asked random oracle query
respectively matching with the positions of the current random oracle query, B queries
the DDH oracle with (W,J, pos3), if the output is 1 and position 3 of the previously asked
random oracle query equals to Ω(W,J), answers with the corresponding random-oracle
value in the table. Else answers with a random value and stores the query and the answer
in the random oracle table.
– Else, answers with a random value and stores the query and the answer in the random
oracle table.
3. If responder = V ∗, B checks the random oracle for a previously asked query, matching with the
current one. If a match found, answers with the corresponding random-oracle value. Otherwise:
– If B found all the positions except position 2 of a previously asked random oracle query
respectively matching with the positions of the current random oracle query, B queries
the DDH oracle with (W, I, pos2), if the output is 1 and position 2 of the previously asked
random oracle query equals to Ω(W, I), answers with the corresponding random-oracle
value in the table. Else answers with a random value and stores the query and the answer
in the random oracle table.
– Else, answers with a random value and stores the query and the answer in the random
oracle table.
4. If A asks a H query such that pos2 = CDH(W,L), B aborts the game and answers the GDH
challenge. (B can find whether pos2 = CDH(W,L) or not by using DDH oracle)
• Test: If the Test query is not asked to Πs∗U∗,V ∗ , B aborts the simulation. Otherwise, B obtains
K ← H(CDH(A,W ),Ω(W,L),CDH(L, Y ),CDH(X,Y ), U∗, L, V ∗, Y ), and uses K as the real session
key.
A.3.3 Event (E1c ∧A∗) : analysis.
The simulation of the view of eCK challenger to the adversary A is perfect except with negligible
probability. The probability that A selects the oracle Πs∗U∗,V ∗ as the test session is at least 1N2PNS , and
the probability of event (E1c ∧A∗) is non-negligible. According to the event A∗, A queries the random
oracle H with (CDH(A,W ),CDH(W,L),CDH(A, Y ),CDH(L, Y ), U∗, L, V ∗, Y ). Hence, B can answer the
GDH challenge with the probability,
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PrGDHg,q (B) ≥
Pr (E1c ∧A∗)
N2PNS
.
Thus,
Pr (E1c ∧A∗) ≤ N2PNS
(
PrGDHg,q (B)
)
. (7)
A.4 Event (E1d ∧A∗)
A.4.1 Event (E1d ∧A∗) : setup.
B establishes NP number of honest parties. For each honest party B maintains at most NS number of
sessions. B chooses two distinct random principals U∗, V ∗ $←− {U1, . . . , UNP }. B sets A = W = gw as the
long-term public key of U∗. For the rest of the parties B sets long-term secret/public key pairs according
to the protocol specification. Note that B does not possess the long-term secret keys of U∗. B chooses a
random number t∗ $←− {1, . . . , NS} and chooses the oracle Πt∗V ∗,U∗ as the partner oracle to the target session.
A.4.2 Event (E1d ∧A∗) : simulation.
Note. In this simulation we assume that U∗ is the initiator of the target session. It is possible to easily
simulate the case where U∗ is the responder as follows: In a place we consider the random oracle query
H(CDH(W,B),CDH(B,X),Ω(W,L),CDH(X,L), U∗, X, V ∗, L), exchange the positions of (CDH(B,X),
Ω(A, Y )), (U∗, V ∗) and (X,Y ) respectively. Particularly, in the simulation of Test query and in the
simulation of the point 4 of H query checks for pos2 = CDH(W,L).
• Send: On behalf of honest protocol principals B selects ephemeral secret/public key pairs according
to the protocol specification. B uses Y = L = g` as the ephemeral public key of Πt∗V ∗,U∗ . Note that
B does not posses the ephemeral secret key of oracle Πt∗V ∗,U∗ .
• Corrupt: If Corrupt query to U∗ is asked, B aborts the simulation. Otherwise B answers all
Corrupt queries faithfully.
• EphemeralKeyReveal: If EphemeralKeyReveal query to partner to Πt∗V ∗,U∗ is asked, B aborts the
simulation. Otherwise B answers all EphemeralKeyReveal queries faithfully.
• SessionKeyReveal: B answers all SessionKeyReveal queries as follows:
1. If A asks a SessionKeyReveal query to an oracle which is owned by principal U∗ and does
not have a partner (where A sends E having come from the partner and B does not posses the
secret key corresponds to E), B uses the function Ω to compute a value to replace CDH(W,E)
as Ω(W,E).
2. For any other SessionKeyReveal query B can easily compute corresponding four Diffie-Hellman
exponentiations, because B knows the long-term secret keys of other principals and ephemeral
secret keys of partnered oracles.
Then B queries the random oracle H with the corresponding values and answers the SessionKeyReveal
query. Since B uses the function Ω to compute values to replace Diffie-Hellman exponentiations,
in places where it does not possess both long-term and ephemeral secret keys, B can maintain
consistency when querying the random oracle H.
• H(pos1, pos2, pos3, pos4, initiator, I, responder, J):
1. If initiator, responder /∈ {U∗}, B simulates the random oracle H in the usual way.
2. If initiator = U∗, B checks the random oracle for a previously asked query, matching with the
current one. If a match found, answers with the corresponding random-oracle value. Otherwise:
– If B found all the positions except position 3 of a previously asked random oracle query
respectively matching with the positions of the current random oracle query, B queries
the DDH oracle with (W,J, pos3), if the output is 1 and position 3 of the previously asked
random oracle query equals to Ω(W,J), answers with the corresponding random-oracle
value in the table. Else answers with a random value and stores the query and the answer
in the random oracle table.
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– Else, answers with a random value and stores the query and the answer in the random
oracle table.
3. If responder = U∗, B checks the random oracle for a previously asked query, matching with the
current one. If a match found, answers with the corresponding random-oracle value. Otherwise:
– If B found all the positions except position 2 of a previously asked random oracle query
respectively matching with the positions of the current random oracle query, B queries
the DDH oracle with (W, I, pos2), if the output is 1 and position 2 of the previously asked
random oracle query equals to Ω(W, I), answers with the corresponding random-oracle
value in the table. Else answers with a random value and stores the query and the answer
in the random oracle table.
– Else, answers with a random value and stores the query and the answer in the random
oracle table.
4. If A asks a H query such that pos3 = CDH(W,L), B aborts the game and answers the GDH
challenge. (B can find whether pos3 = CDH(W,L) or not by using DDH oracle)
• Test: If the Test query is not asked to the partner of Πt∗V ∗,U∗ , B aborts the simulation. Otherwise,
B obtains K ← H(CDH(W,B),CDH(B,X),Ω(W,L),CDH(X,L), U∗, X, V ∗, L), and uses K as the
real session key.
A.4.3 Event (E1d ∧A∗) : analysis.
The simulation of the view of eCK challenger to the adversary A is perfect except with negligible
probability. The probability that A selects the partner to the oracle Πt∗V ∗,U∗ as the test session is at least
1
N2PNS
, and the probability of event (E1d ∧A∗) is non-negligible. According to the event A∗, A queries
the random oracle H with (CDH(W,B),CDH(B,X),CDH(W,L),CDH(X,Y ), U∗, X, V ∗, L). Hence, B
can answer the GDH challenge with the probability,
PrGDHg,q (B) ≥
Pr (E1d ∧A∗)
N2PNS
.
Thus,
Pr (E1d ∧A∗) ≤ N2PNS
(
PrGDHg,q (B)
)
. (8)
A.5 Event (E2a ∧A∗)
A.5.1 Event (E2a ∧A∗) : setup.
B establishes NP number of honest parties. For each honest party B maintains at most NS number of
sessions. B chooses two distinct random principals U∗, V ∗ $←− {U1, . . . , UNP }. B sets B = W = gw as the
long-term public key of V ∗. For the rest of the parties B sets long-term secret/public key pairs according
to the protocol specification. Note that B does not possess the long-term secret keys of V ∗. B chooses a
random number s∗ $←− {1, . . . , NS} and chooses the oracle Πs∗U∗,V ∗ as the target session.
A.5.2 Event (E2a ∧A∗) : simulation.
B uses X = L = g` as the ephemeral public key of Πs∗U∗,V ∗ . Note that B does not posses the ephemeral
secret key of oracle Πs
∗
U∗,V ∗ . This simulation is same as the simulation of Event E1c ∧A∗.
A.5.3 Event (E2a ∧A∗) : analysis.
The simulation of the view of eCK challenger to the adversary A is perfect except with negligible
probability. The probability that A selects the oracle Πs∗U∗,V ∗ as the test session is at least 1N2PNS , and
the probability of event (E2a ∧A∗) is non-negligible. According to the event A∗, A queries the random
oracle H with (CDH(A,W ),CDH(W,L),CDH(A, Y ),CDH(L, Y ), U∗, L, V ∗, Y ). Hence, B can answer the
GDH challenge with the probability,
PrGDHg,q (B) ≥
Pr (E2a ∧A∗)
N2PNS
.
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Thus,
Pr (E2a ∧A∗) ≤ N2PNS
(
PrGDHg,q (B)
)
. (9)
A.6 Event (E2b ∧A∗)
A.6.1 Event (E2b ∧A∗) : setup.
B establishes NP number of honest parties. For each honest party B maintains at most NS number
of sessions. B chooses two distinct random principals U∗, V ∗ $←− {U1, . . . , UNP }. B sets A = L = g` as
the long-term public key of U∗ and B = W = gw as the long-term public key of V ∗. For the rest of the
parties B sets long-term secret/public key pairs according to the protocol specification. Note that B does
not possess the long-term secret keys of U∗ and V ∗.
A.6.2 Event (E2b ∧A∗) : simulation.
This simulation is same as the simulation of Event E2b ∧A∗.
A.6.3 Event (E2b ∧A∗) : analysis.
The simulation of the view of eCK challenger to the adversary A is perfect except with negligible
probability. The probability that A selects an oracle where both U∗ and V ∗ involve (Π·U∗,V ∗ or Π·V ∗,U∗)
as the test session is at least 1
N2P
, and the probability of event (E1b ∧A∗) is non-negligible. According to
the event A∗, A queries the random oracle H with (CDH(L,W ),CDH(W,X),CDH(L, Y ),CDH(X,Y ),
U∗, X, V ∗, Y ). Hence, B can answer the GDH challenge with the probability,
PrGDHg,q (B) ≥
Pr (E2b ∧A∗)
N2P
.
Thus,
Pr (E2b ∧A∗) ≤ N2P
(
PrGDHg,q (B)
)
. (10)
We know that,
AdveCKP1 ≤ max
(
Pr(E1a ∧A∗),Pr(E1b ∧A∗),Pr(E1c ∧A∗),Pr(E1d ∧A∗),Pr(E2a ∧A∗),Pr(E2b ∧A∗)
)
.
Therefore, using equations 5–10 we get that,
AdveCKP1 ≤ max
(
N2PN
2
S
(
PrGDHg,q (B)
)
, N2P
(
PrGDHg,q (B)
)
, N2PNS
(
PrGDHg,q (B)
)
,
N2PNS
(
PrGDHg,q (B)
)
, N2PNS
(
PrGDHg,q (B)
)
, N2P
(
PrGDHg,q (B)
)
.
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